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Abstract
The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the
capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the
free will debate. Traditional compatibilists claim that determinism does not preclude our
capacity for moral agency. Nuanced determinists, such as Derk Pereboom, deny the
existence of moral agency and argue that free will is not required to save the basic modes
of our practical lives, such as our capacity to affect each other and to lead practically moral
lives. I will argue in favor of Kant’s view, which holds that since freedom and moral
agency is metaphysically possible we cannot deny the possibility of free will and morality.
The object of this thesis is to argue for why Kant’s position holds an advantage over
determinism and compatibilism; it is not necessarily to argue for Kant’s argument,
although I do explain and argue for aspects of it in support of my broader goal of
establishing the superiority of Kant’s account.
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Chapter 1
The Stakes of the Debate
Organized society is largely founded on our capacity to be held accountable to our
actions. We find it important to present awards to soldiers for acts of valor and to
academics for contributions to the field. Every day, in some form or fashion, we praise
people for the good things they do and blame them for the bad things they do. However,
barring exempting factors such as mental illness, this entire practice of holding people
accountable to their actions presupposes that we are each responsible for our actions; we
have the capacity for free choice. While it may seem obvious that people deserve to go to
jail for commiting crimes and to receive praise for exceptional acts, it is not obviously
clear that free will exists. Without free will, our entire system of accountability is
unfounded; and if free will is metaphysically impossible, then we may also stand to lose
our privileged status as persons.

Challenges and Strategies
The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the
capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the
free will debate. There are essentially three sides to the debate: determinists, who reject
free will and morality; compatibilists, who seek to reconcile free will with determinism;
and libertarians, who hold that free will is possible because nothing is determined.1 The

There are of course different forms of these three camps, but this is the fundamental layout of the
debate.
1
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challenge of this debate is that there are numerous conflicting conceptions of what kind of
freedom morality requires and whether we stand to lose much if free will is false. The
strategy is to begin with an argument an opponent will readily accept, and then use that
shared premise to expose an incoherency in the opponent's argument. As we expose
conflicts within the opponent's argument, we reduce the numerous paths the opponent
could take in order to avoid abandoning her framework. At a certain point, the opponent
will be obliged to abandon her framework and take seriously an argument which is at least
metaphysically sound.

Lay of the Land
Determinism can be subdivided into hard and soft. Hard determinism is at one
extreme of the free will debate. Hard determinism wholly rejects the possibility for free
choice and maintains that every action is determined in time. Hard determinism rejects all
forms of moral accountability. Soft determinism, which in a sense a form of compatibilism,
tows a middle ground between the two extremes of the debate and accepts that
determinism is true, insofar as our actions are qualified by the temporal sequence, but
nevertheless holds a deflated sense of free will in which some human action can be free –
such as choosing between giving the money to the criminal or running away.
Libertarians hold that since everything is indetermined, then there is nothing
incoherent about an agent making free choices for those actions which have yet to
materialize; these are actions made possible by indeterministic events. However,
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libertarianism by itself is a weak position. For free will to be possible under libertarianism,
every action must align with the indeterminant event, which is a dubious condition given
the small probability of our actions aligning with such spontaneous circumstances.
Traditional compatibilists, similar to the soft determinists, entertain the possibility
of moral agency insofar as one has the ability to choose between a possible set of
outcomes. However, the compatibilist conception of free action is insufficient to preserve
morality. On a compatibilist view, my ability for free choice is limited to the extent of what
is made possible by the temporal order. If determinism is true, then every present action is
fixed to previous actions, all the way back to the beginning on time. Traditional
compatibilism of free will and determinism offers nothing less than an illusion of free will
and morality. No matter how we view the free will debate, free will as it is properly
understood is not possible if determinism by itself is true.
To understand why Determinism by itself rules out free will consider the following
case: a race car driver making a successful turn on the track is caused by the driver’s
turning of the wheel at the appropriate moment. The turning of the wheel is caused by the
driver’s movement of the arm muscles. The driver’s arm movement is caused by the firing
of brain’s neurons. The firing of the brain’s neurons is caused by the stimuli feeding into
the brain. These stimuli are caused by the driver’s sensory perceptions. These particular
sensory perceptions are caused by the drivers present situation. The driver’s present
situation is caused by a previous situation (such as the driver getting into the car). This
causal lineage can be traced back in infinatum; the causes can be traced back in time until
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we arrive at the initial cause of everything. The driver’s present situation is informed by
previous situations, and so the possible actions the driver can take are fixed to what came
prior, and so the driver’s capacity for free will is likewise qualified.
As Kant argues, asserting determinism by itself precludes free will and morality:
“... all the actions of the human being in appearance are determined in accord with
the order of nature by his empirical character and other cooperating causes; and if we could
investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would
be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary
given its preceding conditions. (A549-50/B577-8)”
As I will argue, free will properly understood (by Kant) is the ability to be the
undetermined source of one’s actions.2 For Kant, free will implies the ability to begin a
series of events; the ability to be the initial cause of one’s actions. This conception of free
will is called transcendental freedom. Practical freedom, made possible by transcendental
freedom, is the ability to will this sense of free action within the determined temporal
order.
The distinctions formed above are not set in stone and are helpful to the extent they
illustrate the spectrum of views and inform a successful strategy for arguing against

This is Kant’s conception of free will which, as I will argue throughout the paper, is the only
conception of free will which can support moral imperatives of the sort we require in our daily
lives. There are other philosophers, such as the compatibilist Harry Frankfurt, who claim that moral
agency suggests the ability to do otherwise than one did – that if we have the ability to act
differently than we did, then we have the ability to will moral outcomes. However, as will become
apparent later on in the paper, Frankfurts “could have done otherwise” argument” also requires the
ability that one be the source of one’s actions if one is to be held to moral imperatives.
2
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opponents. There are philosophers who attempt to craft some combination of the views
discussed earlier. For the purposes of this thesis there are two especially noteworthy
philosophers in that camp: Immanuel Kant and Derk Pereboom. In response to the
problems associated with traditional compatibilism, Kant attempts to show by means of a
new form of compatibilism that free will and determinism need not conflict.3 In stark
contrast, Derk Pereboom denies that the rejection of free will and morality is detrimental
insofar as we can carve out enough room to save the modes of our practical lives; namely
things such as the ability to hold legitimate emotional responses to the actions of others. If
there is some means by which we can affect each other's actions (and save the modes of
interaction), then perhaps determinism is not so bad afterall – or so proponents of that view
claim. In this next chapter I will first present Pereboom’s case against free will. I will then
argue in proceeding sections that Pereboom’s nuanced approach to the free will debate is
illusory, with the broader goal of showing why the best argument in the debate is Kant’s.
***

Chapter 2
Derk Pereboom and the case for Practical Morality
Pereboom denies the freedom required for morality by arguing that the case for
practical freedom is incompatible with determinism of the temporal order and/ or credible

3

This new form of compatibilism, “Kant’s compatibilism,” is inspired by Allen Wood. For the
purposes of this thesis I am operating on Allen Wood’s two-worlds interpretation of Kant’s
argument. The alternative, the one-world interpretation, provides for the same conclusion that
morality is metaphysically possible but takes a different route to establish that conclusion.

9

forms of indeterminism (such as quantum mechanics). The freedom required for morality
is precluded by determinism because any present action or deliberation is fettered to the
causal chain of action’s past, and so all present actions are already determined.
Indeterminism is equally fatal to morality because everything that happens is the result of
mere coincidence at the quantum level; and so although things are not determined by the
causal chain, we lack the freedom causally-efficate thing since everything is in flux.
Pereboom’s goal is to establish the causal-efficacy of reason-responsiveness as grounds for
preserving morality despite his views against the freedom required for morality. For the
purposes of this thesis I will refer to Pereboom’s position as Practical Morality; a
conception of morality which denies the possibility of moral agents, but preserves the
practice of striving for moral action on practical grounds.
Pereboom maintains that “determinism is true” and “it is true that according to
hard determinism we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, and
therefore, what happens cannot be affected by choices that are free in this sense”
(Determinism Al Dente [DAD], 22/31). In principle, Pereboom advocates for a notion of
causal efficacy in which person X consciously encourages person Y to act differently
than she has is the past. Since Pereboom thinks we are reason-responsive, then Pereboom
can establish legitimate emotional responses to loved ones when they do something either
good or bad, and then argue that we can strive to act morally on these grounds.
Although Pereboom concedes that the freedom required for moral responsibility is
impossible, he wants to carve out enough space to save what is required of relationships;
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namely the legitimacy of emotional responses we experience in response to the actions of
our friends, peers, and loved ones. Pereboom suggests he can save relationships by
showing that although we cannot be held morally accountable, we are nevertheless
responsive to reasons, and that we can affect each others actions by appealing to these
reasons in the form of encouragement and admonishment (DAD, 22).
Pereboom believes that there is utility in striving for morality even if we never have
the capacity to fully achieve it; that “even if no one is ever really morally responsible, it
would still be best sometimes to hold people morally responsible” because people are
nevertheless responsive to reasons. And so although we cannot blame people for their
actions, we can at the very least encourage them to act otherwise than they did (DAD, 32).
Pereboom’s conception of encouragement or admonishment as they relate to practical
morality is distinguished from his conception of praise and blame as they relate to moral
agency. Praising or blaming someone presumes that they are morally accountable for their
actions insofar as they themselves are the causally effective force of their actions, and as
such are deserving of blame or praise in virtue of their willing certain actions. Consider the
following:
When we praise Teddy Roosevelt for overcoming his Asthma, we presume that
Roosevelt willed c ertain deliberate and free actions to accomplish his goal; and
that he could have done otherwise; such as choosing to not to overcome his
Asthma. Conversely, for Pereboom, encouraging or admonishing someone only
requires that they are responsive to these inputs, regardless of their agency over
11

them, and that their actions can be affected accordingly regardless of
determinism. If we were to encourage Teddy to overcome his Asthma, we would
presume that he would be responsive to our encouragement, regardless of whether
or not Roosevelt himself could will the outcome qua himself. Even if Roosevelt
did not will to overcome his Athma, he could nevertheless be causally-efficated to
overcome his Asthma by appealing to his reason-responsiveness.
The distinction between the two cases is a matter of where the causal efficacy is
placed: in the former, Roosevelt’s free will is the causally-effective force of his actions,
while in the latter, reason-responsiveness is the casually effective force of the outcome.
Pereboom is able uphold the latter case because it does not require a notion of practical
freedom independent of causally determined things.
To achieve the causally-effective notion of reason-responsiveness, Pereboom
claims to “legitimately appropriate...[Ayer and Dennett's] position.. that the determinism of
our deliberations, choices, actions, and their consequences does not undermine their causal
efficacy,” and that this causal efficacy can be leveraged to strive for morality (DAD, 31). I
argue, however, that there are two intimately related parallel objections to Pereboom: (1) If
Pereboom’s argument about indeterminism is true, then reason-responsiveness could not
be causally effective. (2) With respect to Pereboom’s determinism, the causal efficacy of
reason-responsiveness by means of deliberation suffers from an illusion of freedom; I
argue that that although causally efficacious, reason-responsiveness and our deliberations
in general are still causally determined under Pereboom’s account, and thus not sufficient
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to carve out enough space for one to deliberately affect another. In both objections, the
apparent causal efficacy of reason-responsiveness by coincidence aligns with the causally
determined sequence or the indetermined sequence, thereby precluding the possibility for
legitimate deliberation and affection.
Pereboom’s objection to libertarian free will is that “random physical events are no
more in our control than are causally determined events,” and so we lack the capacity to
affect change (DAD, 28). Pereboom does briefly entertain the idea that indeterminism
could accommodate agent-causation such that we are able to affect things since the
causality of things is not predetermined; but the possibility of such action is too narrow to
allow for consistently free action(28). However, if his coincidence argument against
libertarian free will works, then it also denies the causal-efficacy he needs.
If the world is founded on an indeterministic base, and it is in virtue of this
indetermined base that nothing is determined, then the causal-efficacy is likewise placed at
the indetermined level; and as such instances of practical morality above the base at the
macro level would by chance align with the indeterministic event. If the world is based on
indeterministic things, then everything above that base (the “macro world”) is
indetermistically determined by things at the base; and so not only do we lack the freedom
required for morality, but we also lack the ability to appeal to causally-efficacious things
such a reason-responsiveness because outcomes are determined randomly at the quantum
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level (Schaffer, 506/507).4 Since everything is in flux at the base, there is nothing
grounding the causal efficacy of reason-responsiveness and so this capacity is illusory for
libertarians. With respect to determinism (which Pereboom thinks is true), Pereboom says
that if someone thinks that the freedom of the sort required for moral responsibility is
possible, then they are under some sort of illusion (DAD, 31). The problem for Pereboom
is that if his arguments against free will work, then he himself shares the illusion.
Pereboom maintains that all present actions are causally necessitated by the
consequences of actions past (DAD, 22). Pereboom objects to himself when he attempts to
carve out the possibility of consciously and willfully affecting our loved one’s by means of
deliberation (DAD, 22/23). Reason-responsiveness presupposes the the capacity of
deliberation, for this deliberation is what informs us of the means by which we may try to
affect each other and explains our reasons for responding as we do. Conscious deliberation
as required for reason-responsiveness necessitates that we be the cause of such actions.
However, if determinism is true and we lack control over our actions, then this deliberation
is illusory. It is a matter of happenstance when A’s apparently deliberate appeal to Y’s
reason-responsiveness results in the same outcome required by the temporal sequence.
These forms of ostensible deliberation are not forms of legitimate deliberation because
they are necessitated. Since Pereboom believes that determinism is true, he cannot
concurrently argue that reason-responsiveness is causally efficacious in virtue of our

4

See Schaffers Monism for a discussion on physicalism and its consequences for causality in the
macro world.
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capacity for deliberation. Pereboom’s notion of the causal efficacy of
reason-responsiveness is consequently illusory for the same reason that free action in an
indetermined world amounts to blind chance. Pereboom can not save practical morality
with an illusory belief.
Even if there is utility in believing in the causal efficacy of reason-responsiveness,
insofar as practical morality is beneficial to a good life, it is dubious that Pereboom claims
that determined or indetermined actions can be said to be morally good or bad (DAD, 32).
It is incoherent that Pereboom denies the freedom required for moral responsibility, but
also suggests that we strive to act morally. To suggest that someone should strive for
morality is to suggest that someone should strive to be the initial cause of their actions. But
this is impossible for Pereboom. If Pereboom is to preserve his view that although moral
agency is not something that we have the capacity to command but something we can
strive for, then he must establish something else which grounds morality as a legitimate
concept. Even if this grounding did exist, we would still lack the capacity to strive for it
because, to Pereboom, we lack the capacity for deliberation. If Pereboom maintains that he
is striving to act morally by means of his practical morality, then Pereboom suffers from
the same illusory belief discussed earlier .
Pereboom is now faced with defending that all of our reasoning is either necessarily
indeterminately random or necessarily determined such that the causal-efficacy he seeks is
precluded if he is to uphold his views against free will. If Pereboom wishes to save the sort
of affection necessary for relationships, then he is required to accept a framework which
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divorces some aspect of the intelligible self from the causally determined temporal order
such that transcendental freedom (and thus causality of the sort Pereboom requires) is
possible. Even if Pereboom decides to retreat to the hardest of hard determinism and
abandon his practical morality altogether, I will argue that Pereboom is still obliged to take
seriously Kant’s argument for free will.

Primer for Kant
If reason seems to be something that can operate in accordance to the causally
determined temporal order and at the same time independently of it, we are able to
consciously make it so that, or encourage that, someone acts differently. Since things in
time are determined, and since Kant suggests that reason is free to ponder beyond the
determined realm, there must be an extent to which reason is transcendentally free from
the temporal sequence. The faculty of reason is able to be practically free because it equips
the otherwise causally determined material self with something which is transcendentally
free, thereby relieving the material self from the fetters of determinism.
***

Chapter 3
Recap and Introduction to Kant’s Position
In the last section I explained why Pereboom’s argument for our ability to affect
each other vis a vis reason-responsiveness is illusory. If either determinism or credible
forms of indeterminism (such as quantum mechanics) is true, then any instance of

16

ostensible deliberate reason-responsiveness is a matter of happenstance in which X’s
conscious appeal to Y’s reason-responsiveness parallels either the determined sequence of
the causal chain or the intederminent event.
In this section, I will present what Kant’s response would be to those who deny the
sort of freedom required for morality. I will then argue that this is the most compelling
response to opponents of free will. Although Kant cannot determine that free will exists, all
he needs to prove in order to defeat opponents of free agency and morality is that his
argument is as least metaphysically possible; opponents of free agency will then be
charged with the burden of proving that Kant’s argument is false if they wish to maintain
their views against moral responsibility. The genius of Kant’s approach is the simple but
sophisticated goal of showing that "the power to being a state on one’s own" (A533/B561)
is nonetheless metaphysically possible, thereby forcing his opponents into a similar
position of conceding that they lack sufficient reason to reject morality on deterministic
grounds.

Kant’s Metaphysics of Free Will and Morality
Kant’s goal is to show that determinism and morality need not conflict. Kant’s
compatibilism of free will and determinism is distinguished from orthodox notions of
compatibilism in the following way: recall that traditional compatibilists seek to carve out
space for free will within the temporal order despite determinism being true. For traditional
compatibilists, actions are free in virtue of our ability to do otherwise despite determinism
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being true. The problem for traditional compatibilists, however, is that it is dubious as to
whether any action can be truly free within the determined temporal sequence. While free
will to a traditional compatibilists may be the choice between two or more actions, such
choices result in none other than “freedom of the turnspit” (KpV 5:94) in which regardless
of the choices we make, our actions are nevertheless fettered to the temporal order.
Traditional forms of compatibilism should be rejected because they do not satisfy the
requirements of free will as it is properly understood. In summary, free will, properly
understood by Kant, is "the power to being a state on one’s own" (A533/B561); it is the
ability of an agent to be the initial cause (independent of external causes), or unconditioned
cause, of an action or sequence of events (A448/B476). I will first present a summary of
the groundwork for Kant’s argument, and then show why to deny transcendental freedom
(the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility) is self-refuting (as interpreted by
Wood). I present Kant’s argument from the top down, starting with the sort of freedom
Kant thinks is required for moral agency, and then discussing how Kant is able to establish
the metaphysical possibility for this freedom.

Moral Agency Made Possible by Transcendental Freedom
Since, according to Kant, determinism is true, then there must be something in
virtue of which the freedom required for moral responsibility is made possible. In order to
uphold freedom in a practical sense, Kant must show that this practical freedom is
grounded outside of the temporal order. To do this Kant will need to account for the
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existence of things in themselves, and show why this transcendental realm is
metaphysically possible. But more on that later. Transcendental freedom is understood as
the ability to be the uncaused cause of a sequence of events; such as the initial cause of the
causal chain of the temporal order; the power to being a state on one’s own" (A533/B561;
A534/B562). Practical freedom, made possible by transcendental freedom, “is the
independence of our power of choice from coercion by impulses of sensibility” within the
temporal order (A534/B562). In one sense, practical freedom is the ability to abstain from
sensuous impulses, and in another, the ability to will certain actions motivated by the
faculty of reason (Wood 79-83). The faculty of reason enables us to have this
independence and to abstain from sensual impulses. This practical reason, grounded in its
pure form outside of the determined order, is the causally effective and practically free
mechanism which allows us to abstain from otherwise causally determined impulses
(A803/B831).
Transcendental freedom, on the other hand, must be independent of the temporal
order if it is to operate with unmitigated freedom and as such “demands an independence
of this reason itself” (A803/B831). Transcendental freedom is beyond reason (reason as
understood in the realm of appearances) because it does not conform to any pre-established
principles; for to say that transcendental freedom operates on some pre-established
principle is to say that there exist a pre-existing cause for this principle. Since
transcendental freedom consists in being the uncaused cause of something, it is free from
any and all external restrictions, including reason as it operates in the temporal order
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(A533/B561). That being said, what matters here is that we establish that practical freedom
is necessary for morality, and that it operates within the laws of nature but nevertheless
provides for the freedom of the sort required for morality. I find it important to reiterate the
following point: of his project Kant notes that he has “not been trying to establish the
reality of freedom...” but to show that “nature at least does not conflict with causality
through freedom” (A558/B586). Although transcendental freedom may conflict with the
laws of nature, Kant need only show that it is possible in order to maintain the validity of
practical freedom (A803/B831).

Appearances and Things in Themselves
Allen Wood in Kant’s Compatibilism argues for a two-worlds interpretation of
Kant's account of things in themselves. The two-worlds interpretation advocates for a
distinction between the world of appearances and the world of things in themselves. Our
modes of sensibility require a spatiotemporal framework; objects could not exist without
space and change could not occur without time. In one respect knowledge of sensible
things is made possible by our faculties of sensibility and in another our knowledge is
restricted by the limits of our sensibility (A239). The objects we perceive in space and over
time are merely appearances of the things in themselves (A26/A33). Our spatiotemporal
framework for sensing these things could not be something learned from experience, for I
could not imagine things existing without space nor could I comprehend causality without
prior knowledge of time. But since we do understand things within a spatiotemporal
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framework, we must have possessed this framework prior to sensible experience
(A42/B59). The things in themselves must exist independent of the sensible realm since
space and time are a priori intuitions which exist only in us, and thus makes the
spatiotemporal representations of things dependant on the human constitution (A26/B42;
A32–33/B49). Again, Kant maintains that we cannot know anything about things in
themselves, but all he seeks to accomplish is to demonstrate that such things are
metaphysically possible (A239).
It is in virtue of this distinction between appearances and things in themselves that
the noumenal self (the timeless and completely free aspect of the self) makes practical
freedom in the realm of appearances possible. Our will is not subject to the laws of nature
but subject to the law of reason – a mode of the noumenal self – which we give ourselves a
priori (before sensible experience) (A551/B579). We are practically free agents because
the initial cause of the temporal sequence is the noumenal self; and the faculty of practical
reason is likewise self-legislated from the noumenal self and transcends the temporal order,
and thus the determinism.
Recall the early conversation regarding the disagreement of what kind of freedom
morality requires, and in what circumstances people can be held morally accountable. It
would reduce the force of moral imperatives if we are only to be held morally accountable
for our actions under certain conditions. In Wood’s interpretation of Kant’s view, we are
always free from determinism even when we fail to exercise that freedom (Wood, 82), and
so we are always subject to moral accountability (barring cases of mental disabilities or
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other relevant exempting factors). Wood accounts for our failure to exercise our freedom
by suggesting that the exercise of freedom requires power, and Kant holds that "only
freedom with regard to the inner legislation of reason is really a power; the possibility of
deviating from legislative reason is a lack of power" (TL 227g 26e). We fail to exercise our
freedom when we lack the power required for its execution. This is not to say however,
that we fail to act freely because we lack practical freedom. If I fail to complete the
marathon it is not because I lacked the ability to run, but because I lacked the power to
execute on my ability to run. I can still be blamed for failing to complete the race because I
was previously able to run, and I knew or should have known to prepare myself in advance
so as to possess the power to execute my ability to run. Likewise, people may still be held
morally accountable even when they act on sensuous impulses because they are practically
free and always command the capacity for free action, despite determinism being true
(A534/B562).
Transcendental freedom and trascendental things, which make possible free will
and morality, may be impossible to learn about – insofar as our access to this type of
knowledge is epistemically limited – but their existence is nevertheless metaphysically
possible. The force of this conclusion must not be understated. There are certainly
numerous objections, some of which I will entertain shortly. Regardless, determinists do
not have anything substantial with which to respond to Kant.

22

Objections
A. The Ontology of the Noumenal and Phenomenal Selves
The question of the ontology of the noumenal and phenomenal selves poses a
considerable challenge to the two-worlds theory, but not fatally so. While Wood has
trouble reconciling this problem, it must be noted that we lack epistemic access to the
transcendent realm and ultimately there is little we can do to resolve this problem beyond
establishing its metaphysical possibility.
Kant says that it is possible “to regard an event on one side as a merely natural
effect, yet on the other side as an effect of freedom” (A543/B571). Our will, a mode of the
intelligible self (endowed by the noumenal self), is not subject to the laws of nature but
subject to the law of reason which we give ourselves a priori (A551/B579). As Wood
notes, Kant argues that although events in time follow a necessary causally determined
order, a timeless choice of my intelligible character nevertheless affects the natural world,
insofar as our timeless selves affect our material characters (whether by endowing the
phenomenal self with a character disposition, traits, or personalities) (Wood, 91). The
actions of our material selves are consequences of the character our timeless selves create.
For each choice that the timeless self makes, there is a subset of possible worlds in which
this material character could potentially exist (given the demands of the laws of nature).
Once the phenomenal character has been established, its actions must conform to the
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natural laws of the empirical world; but the cause of the specific temporal order itself is a
result of the subset of possible worlds in which the specific character could exist (Wood,
91). Thus, even though our actions in time are determined by the temporal order, the cause
of the character’s will itself exists outside of this determinism and accordingly affords the
phenomenal self with the capacity for practical freedom. Kant says that "reason has
causality in regard to appearance; its action can be called free, since it is exactly
determined and necessary in its empirical causality (the mode of sense). For the latter is
once again determined in the intelligible character (the mode of thought)" (A551/B579).
The freedom required for morality – the state of beginning a series in itself – is made
possible in the determined phenomenal world because the determination is an effect of the
noumenal self, and so ultimately we remain in control of our actions.

B. Indeterminism
Indeterminism for Pereboom precludes the causal-efficacy of things like
reason-responsiveness because change occurs for no reason; things are in indeterminate
flux. This consequence of indeterminism was integral to showing why Pereboom’s
conception of practical morality is illusory. Since Kant, like Pereboom, presupposes that
determinism is true, it may appear that the indeterminism objection to Pereboom also
applies to Kant. I argue, however, that Kant’s argument maintains his structural advantage
over Pereboom’s on this score. For Kant, the source of causal efficacy is found outside of
the realm of appearances in the transcendental realm. Recall that transcendental freedom is
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the ability to be the initial cause, or the causal-efficacy of all subsequent causes. It is not a
problem for Kant that we lose the sort of causal-efficacy Pereboom requires because our
capacity for causally-efficacting things is grounded outside of the undetermined realm of
appearances. In fact, asserting indeterminism may actually help Kant because it alleviates
the concerns associated with the ontology of the noumenal and phenomenal selves
discussed above. If indeterminism is true, then for Kant we are still the initial cause of the
indetermined sequence. While indeterminism reduces the probability of free action for
traditional libertarians, it only strengthens Kant’s notion of beginning a series in itself since
the cause of indeterminate outcomes is us (as opposed to the outcomes on a traditional
libertarian view resulting from mere chance). Kant is in a sense a libertarian about free will
– for he maintains that our actions are not determined – and asserting indeterminism in the
realm of appearances may actually resolve some of the concerns discussed earlier.
***

Chapter 4: Conclusion
Given the stakes of the free will debate, and given the force of determinism, the
impact of Kant’s argument must not be understated. While Kant’s account results in some
spooky conclusions, such as the existence of an aspect of ourselves outside of the realm of
appearances which we are epistemically limited in accessing but nevertheless know is
there, the structural advantage of the argument provides an effective means of preserving
our moral intuitions. Pereboom seeks to preserve our moral intuitions but premises his
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argument on an illusory belief. Kant’s argument, which is metaphysically possible, holds a
structural advantage over the others. Kant’s argument is essentially that because we don’t
know whether free will exists we cannot with good reason reject morality; to entirely deny
transcendental freedom is self-refuting on this score.
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